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Abstract
This article analyzes the opportunities of the Chinese initiative “One Belt, One Road”, for the 
development of the Baltic Sea macro-region (BSR), as a single transport cluster. One of the objectives 
of the initiative is to strengthen transport linkages from the Pacific Ocean to the Baltic Sea Region. 
Thus, the contemporary macro-regional approach to the development of EU macro-regions can 
provide an additional impulse to the creation of formal macro-regional inter-cooperation, via in this 
case, the project that will advance the transport infrastructure of the region. This study examines 
the situation of the railway sector in the BSR in the period 2004–2015, through hierarchical cluster 
analysis, to identify countries with similar trends in cargo flow turnover. Taking into account the 
favorable geographical position of Poland, its transport performance and advanced (in comparison 
to other Baltic Sea region countries) relations with China, it is concluded that Poland’s conditions 
are more suitable to promote economic integration with its closest neighbors – the Baltic countries- 
through the creation of formal macro-regional railway transport within the Rail Baltic project.
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Introduction
The increasing role of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (the 
BRICS), especially that of Russia and China, is widely discussed as a 
key symptom of the changing patterns in the global economy. In 2013, 
China presented its grandiose initiative “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR), 
also known as the New Silk Road, which has acquired wide international 
coverage.
The initiative brings together China, Central Asia, Russia and Europe and 
offers them huge potential for economic development (State Council 
2015). One of the five goals set by the Chinese government is to strengthen 
the global transport network, connecting China with other continents, their 
regions (including the Baltic Sea Region) and countries, boosting inter- 
and intraregional cooperation. The focus is on the elimination of transport 
bottlenecks, the development of trans-border transport infrastructure and 
the creation of new international corridors and multimodal hubs (State 
Council 2015; Summers 2016).
On the international arena, the economic and political expansion of 
China is seen as a specific diversification tool, which is still at the planning 
stage and can face many serious challenges along the way (European 
Council of Foreign Relations 2015; Qingguo 2015; Huang 2016; Sárvári and 
Szeidovitz 2016). Summers (2016) divides the positions of the international 
community towards China’s intentions into two main categories: 1) OBOR 
is seen as an instrument for promoting China’s geopolitical and diplomatic 
expansion through investment injections into stakeholders’ economies 
in such a clever setting as to have control over them and their political 
choices; 2) OBOR is seen as a tool for China’s economic and commercial 
expansion to new markets to benefit its industrial companies, and the 
promotion of the national currency yuan as the new regional currency.
However, the construction of the OBOR is less likely to meet obvious 
strategic resistance from the Central and Eastern European countries 
(CEECs) (Liu 2014) and especially of the Baltic countries, because it offers 
opportunities for boosting their economies through increasing demand 
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towards transport services, which strongly depend on international 
relations between the European Union (EU), Russia and China. Moreover, 
the last decade demonstrates that bilateral relations between the Baltic 
countries with strategic trade partners tend to be of a complex character. 
For example, politically premature decisions made by the Baltic countries 
in their bilateral relations with the biggest actors of Russia (in 2007) and 
China (the visits of the Dalai Lama to the Baltic countries) have resulted 
in freezing, or in some cases even crises in national business and transport 
activity (Koppel 2008; Bochra 2015). In addition to political issues, cyclical 
economic fluctuation affects the trade and transport activity of the 
whole region. Still, after seven post-global economic crisis years, the BSR 
failed to achieve its pre-crisis (2004-2006) indicators of transport sector 
performance. 
Background
EU exports to China constituted 9.5% (imports 20.2%) of its total exchange 
volume in 2015 (European Commission 2017). All countries of the BSR are 
net importers of Chinese products. China’s share in their import structures 
varies from 3% (in Lithuania) to 13% (in Denmark). Denmark, Poland and 
Norway can be considered as major trade partners in the region for China, 
their average imports from China were 11% and exports to China were 6% 
in 2015. Around 1% of all Latvian and Estonian exports go to China, and 
Lithuanian exports account for only 0.5% of its total export volume (World 
Bank 2017). These variations are driven from the specialization patterns 
of the different economies and reflect where their companies operate in 
global production chains. 
Presently, maritime transport is still more competitive in cost and capacity 
in Baltic-Chinese mutual relations, but not in the delivery lead time. Chinese 
intentions to extend, within OBOR, railway connections (via its financial 
funds) to Europe will reduce its overdependence on sea transportation 
(Liu 2014) and cause a shift in the international transport modal split 
towards the railway transport mode.
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXIII (78) - 2017
80
The railway infrastructure of the CEECs has traditionally been 
underfinanced by the public sector and the opportunity to attract foreign 
direct investments from China for that purpose is seen as a tool for the 
reanimation of that transport sector, especially in the BSR. From 2010, the 
countries of the BSR have competed for a direct project with Chinese 
investors in the field of Transport and Logistics. As a result, in 2013, Chinese 
FDI inflows reached about 13.1 billion USD in CEECs, whereas the special 
place of Poland in Chinese foreign trade policy is justified by 1.6 billion 
USD invested to it (Jaroch 2016). At the moment, China has actively set 
bilateral agreements with some EU countries for opening a container 









These routes allow delivery of goods via a distributional network to 
the point of destination, reducing Chinese dependence on maritime 
transport. In terms of competition for Chinese cargo, all of the routes 
compete with each other. However, they can be seen as the basis for 
further integration into the main routes of the Silk Road Economic Belt. The 
authors point out here that block trains between Europe and China are 
currently functioning more as an (informal) business initiative. Demand for 
the development of a regular block train is insufficient, and there also 
exists the problem of the lack of return trips from Europe to China (Islam 
et al. 2013). An essential component in the solution of these problems is 
the promotion and realization of intergovernmental (formal) cooperation 
around the macro-regional transport corridors.
The geographical coverage of this study is the BSR, which consists of Poland 
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(PL), the Baltic countries (Estonia - EE, Latvia - LV, Lithuania - LT), Nordic 
countries (Finland - FI, Sweden - SE, Norway - NO, and Denmark - DK), and 
Germany (GE). The territories of all these countries are covered by “old” 
and “planned” transport routes, which have been developed on the 
basis of macro-regional cooperation by national and intergovernmental 
initiatives. These initiatives can be presented as umbrella projects that 
cover countries randomly, regardless of the performance of the country’s 
transport sector, Logistics Performance Index, and involvement in the 
TEN-T corridors (Nežerenko and Koppel 2015).
This study uses the concept of a formal macro-regional transport cluster 
(Nežerenko, Koppel and Tuisk 2017; Nežerenko 2016), developed recently. 
The concept is intended to estimate the level of impact of the components 
of economic cycles on the demand for transport services in the macro-
region (BSR), which helps to determine behavioral patterns of the transport 
sector at different stages of the economic cycle. Moreover, it helps to 
forecast development trends in the transport sector on the basis of its 
cyclical character, and to identify and eliminate potential bottlenecks in 
the sector that may obstruct its sustainable development. The concept 
raises the problem of the predominance of the business (informal) aspect 
of macro-regional cooperation.
The need to analyze the BSR as a macro-regional cluster is justified by the 
accuracy of the OBOR project and by the opportunity to create a formal 
macro-regional transport cluster, which can be promoted as an element 
of the OBOR’s Silk Road Economic Belt. Transport structure development 
in the BSR macro-region addresses not only a transport connection within 
the EU (between “old” and “new” member countries), but calls attention 
to the importance of Baltic Sea infrastructure development concerning 
the interconnectedness between the EU and its Eastern neighbors, 
particularly China and Russia, but also Belarus and Kazakhstan. The authors 
of the study suggest that the Chinese initiative can offer an impulse to 
the creation of formal macro-regional inter-cooperation, which would 
promote the development of the transport sector, revitalizing economic 
growth in the region. Due to involvement of governmental stakeholders 
in the process of international business cooperation, the scale of benefits 
expands, increasing its competitiveness in certain sectors on the global 
level (Nežerenko and Koppel 2015; Nežerenko, Koppel and Tuisk 2017).
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Within the study, the authors set two research questions:
1. How can the Silk Road Economic Belt contribute to the economic 
and transport development of the BSR?
2. What is the effect of bilateral relations of the BSR countries with 
China on cohesion in the region?
Scope of research
In strategic and ambitious infrastructure projects, the question of the 
priorities of the initiative arises. There are two approaches: the first is 
based on industrial activities that accelerate the development of new 
transport routes (demand-side impact). The second approach starts with 
large-scale infrastructure developments in order to attract future industrial 
and other activities (supply-side impact). The New Silk Road is based on 
the second approach, which has great potential to bring capital to the 
BSR, especially to the “new” member-states of the EU, like Poland and the 
Baltic countries, creating perfect conditions for positioning the region as 
an element in a global supply chain. 
The OBOR initiative is comprehensive in its scope, tying together the 
coordination of national economic strategies, the elimination of barriers 
to international trade and investments, and financial cooperation. At the 
same time, efficiently functioning physical infrastructure is considered to 
be a cross-cutting element of the program (Huang 2016).
The OBOR consists of two parts: 1) the Silk Road Economic Belt is an inland 
transport route, which is based on the New Eurasian Continental Bridge 
and spreads from western China towards Europe and 2) the Maritime 
Silk Road is a maritime transport route which starts at the costal area of 
China and links the country with Africa and Europe. The OBOR is not a 
completely new transport route grid; it includes both existing and new 
routes (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Silk Road Routes
Source: Summers 2015
The Silk Road Economic Belt, which is in the scope of the study, consists of:
 ● The Northern corridor (Beijing – Moscow – Helsinki – Rotterdam),
 ● The Central corridor (Beijing – Shanghai – Rotterdam),
 ● The Southern corridor (Fuzhou – Hanoi – Istanbul),
 ● Railway routes (Silk Route trains and Trans-Siberian Railway).
China’s investments into infrastructure projects (excluding private investors 
and lenders) in the coming years are expected to be about 300 billion 
USD (European Council of Foreign Relations 2015). There are two high-
speed railroads planned as cross-border projects of the OBOR, known as 
the main routes, that will connect the Asian region with Europe (Huang 
2016): 
 ● The Eurasian High-speed Rail (starts from England (London), crosses 
the territories of France, Germany, Poland, Ukraine and Russia 
(Moscow), where it will separate into two branches, one of which 
goes to Kazakhstan and another, through Russia’s Far East, to 
northeastern China);
 ● The Central Asian High-speed Rail (starts from northeastern China 
(Urumqi), crosses the territories of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, 
and Turkey, and arrives in Germany).
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As mentioned previously, the OBOR initiative is in its starting stage, and the 
projects are planned for the long term. Its realization could take at least 
35 years (European Council 2016) and the transportation routes will be 
adjusted not only because of the expansion of bilateral business relations 
but due to the development of transport infrastructure already planned 
(i.e. core-corridors of the EU) and the political decisions of key countries. 
Within the scope of this study, the authors’ concern relates to the 
development of land transport routes. It is necessary to shift the focus of 
the study to the South part of the BSR, which can offer rail connection 
within the Silk Road Economic Belt and integrate it into the EU core-
network. From this perspective, the current share of international rail 
freight transport in Denmark, Finland and Norway is low, while Germany, 
Sweden, Poland and the Baltic Countries are located in key international 
transport corridors.
In order to develop the BSR as a gateway for traffic between Asia and 
Russia on one hand, and Europe on the other, it is vital to develop the 
present transport network in the BSR into a formal macro-regional cluster 
which depends on:
 ● The economic power/potential of a region.
 ● The development level of regional infrastructure.
 ● The region’s positioning relative to core national and international 
transport corridors.
The basis of the cluster approach in the organization of the transport 
sector involves the promotion of cross-border cluster cooperation by 
intergovernmental institutions, i.e. the recent Chinese 16+1 Format. The 
next factor that would secure a balanced use of existing and potential 
capacity of the infrastructure of national transport systems, is the 
intensification of cooperation within international transport corridors of 
the region (TEN-T and Core network). Therefore, development of a single 
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Taking into account the geographical scope of the study and the Silk 
Road Economic Belt, there are five major transportation corridors that 
cross the territory of the BSR and can be seen as secondary transportation 
arteries of the OBOR:
1. The Baltic-Adriatic Development Corridor – an intermodal corridor 
which runs from Scandinavia down to the Mediterranean region/
Adriatic. This corridor supports integrated spatial, economic and 
infra-structural development in a country-crossing manner, in the 
European context. The corridor countries are: Austria, the Czech 
Republic, Italy, Poland, and Slovakia. 
2. The North Sea-Baltic Corridor – a railway corridor which stretches 
from the North Sea ports through Poland to the Belarus border, and 
to the Baltic countries as well as to Finland. The key project is Rail 
Baltic and the Tallinn–Helsinki tunnel, which will solve the problem 
connected with the large section of the ‘Organisation for Co-
operation between Railways’ (OSJD) rail gauge being 1520 mm. The 
corridor countries are: Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Poland, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland.
3. The Pan-European Transport Corridor I: an intermodal corridor which 
runs from Poland to Finland and includes rail and road infrastructure. 
Corridor countries are: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Poland. Major projects within the corridor are: Via Baltica, Rail Baltic, 
and the Tallinn-Helsinki tunnel.
4. The Pan-European Transport Corridor IX: an intermodal corridor 
which provides the transportation of transit goods between ports 
located on the shores of the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and the 
Caspian Sea. This transport corridor provides external links of the 
EU with Russia and Turkey (via connection with the Pan-European 
Transport Corridor IV). Countries involved in the corridor are: Greece, 
Romania, Moldova, Finland, Lithuania, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus.
5. The East-West Transport Corridor II (EWTC II): an intermodal corridor 
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There are two main transport modes included into the abovementioned 
corridors – road and rail. The rail chain is of special importance due to 
two EU projects: TEN-T project, Rail Baltic, and the Tallinn-Helsinki tunnel, 
which allow five countries of the BSR (Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, 
and Finland) to cooperate not only in terms of building new infrastructure 
(to eliminate their isolation from West Europe by building the European 
standard gauge 1435 mm), but also in intergovernmental/formal 
promotion of the corridor on the global level (Nežerenko and Koppel 
2015). 
Thus, a formal cluster (based on the sharing and promotion of one rail 
corridor) and an informal railway cluster (based on business cooperation 
and common projects with China) will evolve into a strong macro-cluster, 
providing a stable competitive position of the BSR in the global transport 
and logistics market. In addition, Chinese initiatives will contribute to the 
liquidation of the main bottlenecks of the BSR transport system, including 
the lack of public and private investment resources for the rail sector, and 
the dominant tendency of transport and logistics clusters to only form 
on a national level (Nežerenko 2016). Thus, the OBOR initiative fills in the 
gaps in the existing international economic architecture helping build 
infrastructure projects for the developing and developed countries. 
Hierarchical cluster analysis of the BSR railway 
sector
The authors address the BSR transport sector on a macro-regional level as a 
single formal transport macro-regional cluster, studied as a geographical 
concentration of transport actors in the region. The cluster is characterized 
by (1) formal regulation on behalf of the EU within the European Union 
Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR); (2) homogeneity in the 
development of physical infrastructure; (3) homogeneity in transport 
sector performance; and (4) similar behavioral patterns at different stages 
of the economic cycle (Nežerenko 2016).
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In accordance with the model of a single formal transport macro-regional 
cluster, homogeneity within its members (countries) must be provided. 
Previous analysis by Nežerenko, Koppel and Tuisk (2017) confirms the 
presence of heterogeneity in different transport sectors. However, sea 
transport tends to be a strong macro-regional cluster of informal maritime 
transport, due to numerous projects realized by business stockholders 
under the umbrella of the EUSBSR, launched by Sweden in 2009. 
Macro-regional clustering experience in railway and road transport within 
the most isolated East part of the region is insignificant (Nežerenko and 
Koppel 2015). Taking into account the transport routes promoted by the 
OBOR initiative, the focus of the research is on the rail transport sector.
The authors apply qualitative research methods based on the statistical 
analysis of secondary quantitative data collected from the International 
Transport Forum database. The main tool in the analysis of the BSR railway 
transport activity is hierarchical cluster analysis (HCA), conducted by 
means of the SPSS software using Ward’s method as a criterion that 
minimizes the total within-cluster variance. HCA is a statistical method for 
finding relatively homogeneous clusters of cases on the basis of measured 
characteristics (Tan et al. 2006). The idea of hierarchical clustering lies in 
the identification of each object initially as a single cluster (or country). 
Then, in multiple iterations, the two nearest clusters are merged into a 
larger one (micro-cluster). After a few iterations, the algorithm reaches the 
final cluster structure (macro-cluster/BSR). Thus, the goal of the clustering 
algorithm is to join objects together into successively larger clusters, using 
some measure of similarity or distance (Burns and Burns 2008; Nežerenko, 
Koppel and Tuisk 2017). The results of the analysis are presented by a 
hierarchical tree diagram, called a dendrogram.
In the scope of the HCA conducted in the study, transport activity is 
presented in cargo turnover handled by railway (in tonne-km) between 
2004 and 2015 (see Table 1). The period of time was divided into three sub-
periods: 2004-2007 reflects the economic growth stage of the economic 
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Table 1: International transport of goods by railway, million tonne-km, 
2004-2015
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
EE 9973 9892 9741 7267 5236 5350 5918 5491 4469 4012 2654 2603
LV 16397 17412 14798 16360 17370 14384 12885 21114 21495 19246 19125 18453
LT 10163 9033 9739 11414 11093 8798 10054 11447 10560 9698 10794 10537
DK 1649 1549 1633 1633 1747 1574 2075 2417 2107 2249 1788 2401
FI 2908 3099 3685 2853 3189 2731 2835 2598 2471 2968 3260 2621
NO 777 850 895 919 905 770 763 724 714 992 1022 1205
SE 7667 7547 7378 7569 7141 7213 8636 8415 7653 7605 7855 7291
GE 46478 46864 56484 60832 62390 46956 52788 54278 53739 53590 56241 55692
PL 15527 13961 16133 16919 15676 9580 11684 12925 14658 14685 14694 14277
 
Source: International Transport Forum 2016
There are two limitations to the study: 1) the unavailability of statistical data 
on the origin of cargo flows via CEEC countries; 2) the lack of accurate 
statistical data on the transport performance of the northern parts of 
Poland and Germany. Only those parts of the countries are included in 
the BSR which conform to the definition given by the EC.
Results
Studies of Hätty and Hollmeier (2003), Bălan and Bălan (2010), and Franke 
and John (2011) confirm the cyclical character of the transport field. This 
cyclicity correlates with economic growth cycles measured by the gross 
domestic product. In the recent research of Nežerenko, Koppel and Tuisk 
(2017), this issue was specified and strong correlation was found between 
the GDP of the BSR and investments into road and rail infrastructures, as 
well as between imports and investments into rail and road infrastructure.
The purpose of the HCA was to identify the dynamics of the rail cargo 
turnover of the BSR countries and to compose so called micro-clusters 
consisting of countries with similarities in the dynamic development of 
the railway sector within three economic phases: economic growth (see 
Figure 2a), crisis (see Figure 2b), and recovery (see Figure 2c).
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Figure 2: Dendrogram representing the formation of country clusters 
based on their railway transport flows during 2004-2007 (a), 
2008-2009 (b), 2010-2015 (c)
a)        b)
c)
During the economic growth period, Poland and the Baltic States 
composed a single micro-cluster and enjoyed the trade-creation effect 
(due to joining the European Union in 2004) via growing cargo flows of 
Russian export cargo and investments inflow.
At the beginning of the global economic crisis, Estonia left the cluster 
because of Bronze night and joined a more stable micro-cluster of Denmark, 
Finland, Norway, and Sweden. These countries had demonstrated 
relatively minor fluctuations despite the economic crisis unlike Estonia, 
which had already lost cargo because of the critical character of political 
decisions. In the post-crisis period, the biggest increase in cargo turnover 
(see Table 1) was demonstrated by the countries whose economies in 
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the crisis period were significantly weakened – Latvia and Lithuania 
who composed the micro-cluster with Poland and Sweden. Estonia was 
unable to recover its cargo turnover during 2010-2015 due to unfavorable 
relations with its largest transit ex-partner Russia. This fact confirms that the 
essence of bilateral relations is more important for the development of a 
strategically important sector for the country than economic fluctuations. 
The development of physical infrastructure leads to the expansion of 
trade relations and to the intensification of countries’ and regions’ 
competitiveness. During China’s reform period, the national investment 
program for infrastructure accelerated economic growth (Huang 
2016). If investments inflow into rail infrastructure facilitates economic 
development, we can assume that Chinese financial funds can spread 
positive influence on the whole region via Poland. In addition to Poland’s 
favorable geopolitical location (in the Eurasian Land Bridge), it is one 
of the driving force-countries in the Transport and Logistics sector in the 
region (Nežerenko and Koppel 2015). 
Ketels and Pedersen (2016) report that the BSR is highly dependent on 
the global economy. They point out the following specific concerns for 
the Baltic Sea Region: 1) its weakening position in the world’s exports and 
foreign direct investments markets since 2011 and 2) modest political 
action directed at enhancing long-term competitiveness of the region. 
Thus, economic policymakers need not only manage the current 
economic issues, but they also have to be ready for a possible slowing 
down of the economy in the future gaining from the advanced macro-
regional economic cooperation.
The authors assume that a positive effect from the Chinese OBOR initiative 
can be derived if Estonia is in the same micro-cluster with Poland, Lithuania 
and Latvia. Positioned in the same micro-cluster and unified by common 
railway infrastructure, led by the driving force of Poland, the Baltic States 
will benefit from OBOR.
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Conclusions
The authors conclude that the Chinese initiative will contribute to the 
liquidation of the main bottlenecks of the BSR transport system, such as the 
lack of investment resources for the rail sector and the absence of macro-
cluster cooperation, providing favorable conditions for its sustainable 
economic development. Taking into account the favorable geographical 
position of Poland, its transport performance and its advanced relations 
with China, Poland has better conditions for the promotion of economic 
and transport integration with its closest neighbors – the Baltic countries. This 
cooperation must be based on the formation of the BSR transport cluster 
on the basis of the corridor approach, or within the Rail Baltic, to integrate 
it into it the Silk Road Economic Belt as its secondary transportation artery.
Cohesion in the BSR can be achieved only at homogeneity in the cyclical 
development of the transport sector. The railway sector demonstrates the 
following important heterogeneities within the countries analyzed:
 ● Denmark, Finland and Norway form the most stable micro-cluster 
in terms of railway transport in all three economic periods. The 
demonstrated stability is not only based on their similar geographical 
location, but on the low share of international cargo in their rail 
freight transport as well.
 ● Germany, Sweden, Poland and the Baltic States are located in the 
key international transport corridors, and more fluctuations can be 
observed in the micro-cluster of Poland and the Baltic countries, 
especially the latter whose transport activity depends on transit 
demand.
 ● The railway transport of Latvia, Lithuania and Poland is the most 
vulnerable in the crisis period, also demonstrating the quickest 
recovery within the macro-region.
In order to stay in the same micro-cluster with Poland, the Baltic countries 
must exclude any premature political decisions that are highly likely to 
cause dramatic consequences for international transport activity.
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Despite the fact that cargo turnover transported internationally by rail via 
the BSR is relatively low, it is obvious that the Rail Baltic corridor will make 
the region more attractive to Chinese investors and cargo. Due to the 
route of Rail Baltic and its potential for clustering freight traffic volumes, 
this corridor has great potential for developing cost-efficient services to 
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